One of the most popular narratives emerging from the 2024 US election is the significant shift of non-White voters away from their traditional support for the Democratic Party and their newfound embrace of Republican candidate Donald Trump. That account gained further traction this week with the release of detailed new data from Democratic pollster David Shor and his colleagues who found that, between 2016 and 2024, Hispanic, Black, and Asian voters — especially those who identify as “moderate” or “conservative” — swung toward the Republican Party in large numbers. In fact, the only group which exhibited no discernible partisan shift over this period was White voters.
In conjunction with polling and analytics firm YouGov, we collected granular survey data on Indian Americans ahead of the 2024 elections — the Indian American Attitudes Survey, a rare source of representative data on Indians in the US. Our data demonstrate that the political shift among Indian Americans was in line with this overarching trend. In 2024, 47% of Indian Americans identified as Democrats, down from 56% in 2020. In the 2020 presidential election, Indian Americans favoured Democrat Joe Biden over Republican Donald Trump by a 70:20 margin; just four years later, when Biden’s vice-president Kamala Harris challenged Trump, that advantaged dipped to 60:30.
This shift has fuelled a second narrative — that Indian Americans turned against the Democrats, at least in part, because they felt that the Biden-Harris administration would be worse for US-India relations than Trump. However, our data finds little evidence to support this claim.
For starters, US-India relations do not rank as a top-tier election issue for the diaspora. Like the broader American electorate, Indian Americans referenced inflation, abortion, and jobs and the economy as their most pressing concerns in November 2024; only 4% cited US-India ties as their top election issue. Moreover, among Indian Americans who do not identify as Democrats, only 3% say they dislike the party because they believe it is bad for India. In fact, when asked which party handles US-India relations better, respondents favoured the Democrats over the Republicans by a margin of 41% to 24%. These numbers have hardly budged since 2020, when 39% of Indian Americans reported Democratic administrations were better for US-India ties while 18% preferred Republican administrations.
Indeed, contrary to conventional wisdom, nearly half of all Indian Americans (48%) regard Biden’s handling of US-India relations favourably— significantly higher than the 33% who felt the same about Trump’s record after his first term (2017-2021). In November 2024, when asked which president had the upper hand when it came to managing bilateral ties, 34% named Biden, 28% named Trump, and 26% thought both were about the same. To be sure, these numbers conceal dramatic variation by respondents’ partisan affiliations, reflecting the intensity of partisan polarisation in the US; 50% of Democrats believe Biden was better for the US-India partnership while 66% of Republicans favour Trump.
Some commentators argue that Indian Americans have soured on the Democrats due to the party’s emphasis on democratic backsliding in India. But again, this claim holds little weight: Only 18% of respondents believe the Biden administration prioritised American values over strategic interests. A plurality (31%) report that the Biden administration adequately balanced American values and American interests.
Looking forward, there are clear signs of unease about what Trump 2.0 might mean for the US and India, apprehensions that have been further fuelled by endless talk about the bilateral trade deficit, which Trump and his team plan to remedy with a potentially painful programme of “reciprocal tariffs”. Even six months ago, our survey detected signs of nervousness among Indians in America. When asked whether US-India relations would be stronger in a Harris White House or a second Trump term, 53% favoured Harris while only 40% believed Trump would be better for the relationship; 26% of Indian Americans reported bilateral ties would be weaker under Trump, compared to 15% under Harris.
When it comes to views on India itself, the diaspora exhibits a sunnier disposition. In 2020, only 36% of Indian Americans felt India’s trajectory was on the right track. By 2024, that number had jumped to 47%. This shift may partly reflect reactions to the 2024 Indian general election, which resulted in a greater dispersion of political power and the denial of a third consecutive single-party majority to Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the BJP. Notably, 41% of Indian American respondents believe India has become more democratic since the 2024 polls.
However, this perception shift should not be interpreted as a sign of the diaspora’s disillusionment with Modi. His approval rating among Indian Americans remains relatively stable at 47%, only marginally down from 50% in 2020. But while overall support has not shifted dramatically, there are clear demographic changes. Older respondents (ages 50 and above), women, and those with a lower socioeconomic status are notably less supportive of Modi than they were in 2020. Interestingly, younger Indian Americans are moving in the opposite direction: Support for Modi among those under 30 has surged from 35% in 2020 to nearly 50% in 2024. This aligns with a broader rightward shift among young Americans, as seen in Shor’s data. Our data further validate this finding: Most of the pro-
Republican shift among Indian Americans is driven by young men under 40, especially those born in the US. While US-born young women have also moved rightward, the move is much less pronounced.
The Indian diaspora in the US today is more than five million strong. Its ability to flex its political muscle is well understood by those on both the political Left and the Right. The Modi government has sought to engage the diaspora as a force multiplier for Indian interests. Doing so effectively, however, requires eschewing static narratives about this community, developing instead a more nuanced understanding of the community’s views on matters both domestic and foreign. As our data suggest, there are intriguing changes afoot.
Sumitra Badrinathan is an assistant professor at American University; Devesh Kapur is Starr Foundation Professor the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; and Milan Vaishnav is senior fellow and director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They are co-authors (with Annabel Richter) of a new report, Foreign Policy Attitudes of Indian Americans: 2024 Survey Results. The views expressed are personal
